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DAMAGE LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS 
T HE question of the liability of charitable institutions to actions for damages presents great difficulties. This is not due how-
·ever to a lack of cases. The question has peculiarly "engaged the 
.attention of the bench and bar of the country. The problem has 
been scrutinized from every conceivable viewpoint. The arguments 
for and against have well nigh •been exhausted, and little, if any-
thing, new remains to be advanced" .1 In their opinions the courts 
have frequently gone back to certain English cases disregarding the 
.Points decided but stressing certain dicta which have been uttered 
by the judges which decided them. It is curious tO note that none of 
these cases was really in point. Dunkan v. Findlader, decided in 
1839, involved a claim against the treasurer of a turnpike road 
which seems to have been a public corporation.2 In Mercy Docks v. 
Gibbs, decided in 1864, the defendant was a corporation which pro-
vided docking facilities and the ·plaintiff claimed that a cargo of 
guano had come to grief on account of defendant's negligence.8 
Herriots' Hospital v. Ross, decided in 1846, involved a claim for 
damages on the part of an applicant for rejection from the benefit 
of the charity.~ Though these and other English cases11 ·on their 
very face did not involve the question in which we are interested 
they have nevertheless been drawn on extensively and made to sup-
port propositions which would have astonished the judges who wrote 
the opinions. It would waste valuable space to no useful purpose 
to attempt to trace the use which has been made of these cases by 
American Courts. '!'hey will therefore be passed by hereafter with-
.out any further reference. 
The question of e.xemption from tort liability has frequently come 
up in connection with municipal corporations such as counties, cities, 
towns, villages, and school districts. In such cases it is recognized 
individual grievances must not ov.erride the public good nor make 
1 1918, Magnuson v. Swedish Hospital, 99 Wash. 399, 407, 169 Pac. 828. 
'6 Clark & F. 894, 2 Macl. & Rob. 9u. 
• L. R., 1 Engl. and Irish 93 taffirmed, II H. L. Cas. 68g). 
• 12 Clark & F. 507. 
• See 1901, Powers v. Massachusetts Homceopathic Hospital, :mg Fed. 294, 
47 C. C. A. 122, 65 L. R. A. 372; 188o, Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 
R. I. 411, 423, 426. 427, 34 Am. Rep. 675. 
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that individual advantage must give way to the public welfare and 
the public funds the primary source of individual compensation.6 
A municipality in performing charitable functions is acting as an 
agency of the sovereign and therefore enjoys the sovereign's immu-
nity from suit.7 "In providing for the care of the poor, a police 
power which resides primarily in the sovereignty is exercised, and 
neither the sovereign nor the local governing body to whom such a 
power is delegated is responsible for the misfeasance of its officers".8 
A .municipality is not espec~ally benefited by such work but is per-
forming a service essential for the welfare of the public in preserv-
ing the peace, preventing the destruction of property or performing 
any other kindred obligation and public policy demands that it be 
given immunity .from liability for the negligence of those who actu-
ally perform the duty.9 It has therefore been said that a county is 
not responsible for the acts of officers or employees which it appoints 
in the exercise of a portion of the sovereign power of the State, by 
the requirement of a public law, and simply for the public benefit, 
and for a purpose from which it as a corporation derives no benefit.10 
"Where care and diligence are used.in the selection of a physician the 
officers representing the county have done their duty, and where 
there is no breach of duty there can be no negligence".11 The same 
holds good in regard to school districts,12 boards of school commis-
sioners,18 boards of education,14 towns,1 G poor districts,16 and cities.17 
• I888, Ford v. Kendall Borough School District, I21 Pa. 543, 549, IS Atl. 
"8I2, I L. R. A. 007. 
• 190I, Powers v. Massachusetts Homc:eopathic Hospital, I09 Fed. 294, 
·49 C. C. A. 122, 65 L. R. A. 372 (affirming IOI Fed. 896). 
'I885, Summers v. Daviess County, 103 Ind: 262, 264, 265, 2 N. E. 725, 
53 Am. Rep. 5I2. 
• IgOO, Noble v. Hahnemann Hospital, g8 N. Y. Supp. 6o5, u2 App. Div. 
663, I8 Ann. N. Y. Cas. 365. 
10 1862, Sherboume v. Yuba County, 21 Col. u3, 8I Am. Dec. 15r. 
11 1885, Summers v. Davies County, I03 Ind. 262, 263, 2 N. E. 725, 53 Am. 
Rep. 512. 
12 I888, Ford v. Kendall Borough School District, 121 Pa. 543, 549, 15 At!. 
812, I L. R. A. OOJ. 
13 1902, Weddle v. Frederick County, 94 Md. 334, 51 Atl. 289. 
" 1876, Finch v. Board of Education, 30 Ohio St. 37, 27 Am. Rep. 414-
111 1875, Brown v. Vinalhaven, 65 Me. 402, 20 Am. Rep. 709; 186o, Biglow 
v. Randolph, 8o Mass. (14 Gray) 541. 
18 1902, Peasley v. McKean County Poor District, 26 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 428. 
11 1872, Ogg v. Lansing, 35 Iowa 495, 499, 14 Am. Rep. 409; 1875, Max-
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It does not stop here, however, but extends to other agencies and sub-
agencies ·by which the work of the state is carried on. "If a munic-
ipal corporation which has a twofold character, one public and the 
other private, is exempt from liability for the negligence of its agents 
when in the exercise and performance of its powers and duties as an 
agency of the government, a public corporation which was created 
and exists for no other than governmental purposes must necessarily 
be exempt from such liability".18 On this ground federal soldiers' 
homes,19 State Insane Asylums,20 Industrial Schools,21 houses of 
refuge,22 and city hospitals28 have been exempted from liability. It 
has even been held that this exemption extends to a hospital where a 
city has entrusted its ambulance service to it.24 Of course the mere 
fact that a city is the trustee of a charity does not exempt the charity 
from liability.2~ All these and similar cases, while they may present 
valuable analogies, are not. germane to the subject under investiga-
tion and are therefore disregarded in the following pages. 
While governmental agencies, though they perform charitable 
functions, must be eliminated from the discussion, non-charitable 
organizations in the technical sense of the word, though they may do 
much good in their several ways cannot be accorded any more con-
siderate treatment. On the ground that they are not charities ceme-
milian v. New York, 62 N. Y. l6o, 20 Am. Rep. 468 (affinning 2 Hun. 263, 4 
Thomp. & C. 491). 
18 1899, Mala v. Eastern State Hospital, 97 Va. 507, 5u, 47 L. R. A. 57i, 
34 S. E. 617. 
18 1903, Overholser v. National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, @ 
Ohio St. 236, 247, 67 N. E. 487, 62 L. R. A. 936, 96 Am. St. Rep. 658; 1909, 
Lyle v. National Home, 170 Fed. B4z. 
"'1903, White v. Alabama Insane Hospital, 138 Ala. 479, 35 So. 454; 1!)06, 
Leavell v. Western Kentucky Asylum, 122 Ky. 213, 91 S. W. 671, 28 Ky. Law 
Rep. 1129, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 26g. 
21 18g4, Williamson v. Louisville Industrial School, 95 Ky. 251, 24 S. W. 
1065, 44 Am. St. Rep. 243, 23 L. R. A. 200, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 629; 1903. Cor-
bett v. St. Vincent's Industrial School, 177 N. Y. 16, 68 N. E. 99i (affirming 
79 N. Y. Supp. 369, 79 App. Div. 334). 
"' 1885, Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20, 28, 52 Am. Rep. 495. 
:a 1869, Murtaugh v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 479; 1867, Richmond v. Long, 17 
Gratt 375, 94 Am. Dec. 46x. 
"'1!)06, Noble v. Hahnemann Hospital. g8 N. Y. Supp. 6o5, n2 App. Dh·. 
663, 18 Ann. N. Y. Cas. 365 • 
.. 1902, Winnemore v. Philadelphia, 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 625. 
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teries,2° medical colleges,27 protective departments,28 or fire insurance 
patrols,29 private sanitariums,30 commerce hospitals,81 mutual benefit 
societies,82 agricultural societies,83 and even Young Men's Christian 
Associations8' have been denied exemption. With such and similar 
cases we are therefore not concerned. The exemptions of charities 
only in the strict and technical sense of the term is the subject of 
this paper. 
The elimination of governmental agencies and non-charitable ven-
tures still leaves certain other situations to be eliminated. Charities 
will ·be held to a fulfillment of their contracts just like any other per-
son or corporation. While on ordinary principles they will not be 
liable on a contract made by one of their agents without authority,sG 
an action of assumpsit foF- a breach of a contract to furnish certain 
accommodations is maintainable against them.88 A patient may 
therefore recover from a hospital for the breach· of a contract to 
furnish a competent nurse37 or to take care of a sick child. 37• 
,.. 1912, East Hill Cemetery Co. v. Thompson, 53 Ind. App. 417, 97 N. E. 
1036, 1037; 1888, Donnelly v. Boston Catholic Cemetery Ass'n, 146 Mass. 163, 
15 N. E. 505. 
"' 1907, Medical College v. Rushing, 1 Ga. App. 468, 473, 57 S. E. 1o83 . 
.. l8go, Newcomb v. Boston Protective Department, 151 Mass. 215, 24 
N. E. 39, 6 L. R. A. 778; 1900, Bates v. Worcester Protective Department, 
177 Mass. 130, 58 N. E. 274 
' 01909, Coleman v. Fire Insurance Patrol, 122 La. Ann. 626, 48 So. 130, 
21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 810; 1910, Rady v. Fire Insurance. Patrol of New Orleans, 
126 La . .z73, 52 So. 491, 139 Am. St. Rep. 51I; 19r5, Sutter v. Milwaukee 
Board of Underwriters, 161 Wis. 615, 618, 155 N. W. 127, Ann. Cas. 1917, 
E• . 
""1902, Galesburg Sanitarium v. Jacobson, 103 Ill. App. 26; 1914, Green 
v. Biggs, 167 N. C. 417, 421, 83 S. E. 553; 1906, Stanley v. Schumpert, u7 
La. 255, 41 So. 565, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 3o6, u6 Am. St. Rep. 202. 
n 1907, Gitzhoffen v. Holy Cross Hospital Ass'n, 32 Utah 46, 88 Pac. 691, 
8 L. R. A. (N. S.) n61; 1907, University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 
564, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 431, lo6 S. W. 219. 
32 1903, Brown v. La Societe Francaise, 138 Cal. 475, 477, 71 Pac. 516. 
33 1909, Logan v. Agricultural Society, 156 Mich. 537, 541, 121 N. W. 485 . 
.. 1896, Chapin v. Holyoke Y. M. C. A., 165 Mass. 280, 42 N. E. u30 . 
.. 1904, Wilson v. Brooklyn Homceopathic Hospital, 89 N. Y. Supp. 619, 
97 App. Div. 37. 
30 1912, Armstrong v. Wesley Hospital, 170 Ill. App. 81. 
"1899, Ward v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 57 N. Y. Supp. 784, 39 App. Div. 
624 (see also s. c. 79 N. Y. Supp. 1004, 78 App. Div. 317). 
sta 1916, Roche v. St. John's Riverside Hospital, 160 N. Y. Supp. 401, g6 
Misc. 289 (affirmed, 161 N. Y. Supp. u43). 
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Another situation which must 'be eliminated has reference to in-
juries occurring in connection with business blocks or other property 
in which the funds of a charity are invested. It goes without saying 
that such property is used by tenants and the public in exactly the 
same manner as if it belonged to an individual or a corporation for 
profit. An exemption extended to it might well be disastrous to the 
charity. It might not be able to find tenants and would therefore be 
inconvenienced rather than benefited by its investment. It has there-
fore been held that where a charitable institution lets a part of its 
building to a tenant for purposes entirely disconnected with charity 
an employee of the institution may recover for injuries suffered 
while helping to carry out the contract ·between the charity and the 
tenant.88 The negligent act of an elevator operator in such a build-
ing has therefore been held to be an incident to the management of 
the property chargeable as among the items of cost}11' 
There is still another subject as to which charities will not be 
allowed to escape liability. They may not create a nuisance on their 
property and after a person has been injured plead their charitable 
character as a defense. "If, in their dealings with their property 
appropriated to charity, they create a nuisance by themselves or their 
servants, if they dig pitfalls in their grounds and the like, there are 
strong reasons for holding them lia'ble to outsiders, like any other 
individual or corporation. The purity of their aims may not justify 
their torts".'0 
The elimination of governmental and charitable agencies and of 
contract liability, nuisance and the like leaves the question of the 
liability of charities for personal injuries to beneficiaries, employees, 
invitees, and strangers as the proper subject of this paper. It is not 
astonishing in view of the high favor with which charities are re-
garded by the courts that there are jurisdictions which have gone to 
extremes in exempting charitable ventures from all claims for dam-
ages whether they have occurred to strangers or patients, whether 
., 19II, Holder v. Massachusetts Horticultural Society, 2n Mass. 3701 97 
N. E. 630. . 
aa l~ Winnemore v. Phitad'elphia, 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 625, 630 • 
.. 1901, Powers v. Massachusetts Homceopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294, 
304, 47 C. C. A. 122, 65 L. R. A. 372. See also. cases cited in 1906, Leavell v. 
Western Kentucky Asylum, 122 Ky. 213, 217, 91 S. W. 671; 28 Ky. Law Rep. 
II2g, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 269. 
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they are the result of the negligence of attendants or the negligence 
of trustees or managers in selecting them. Where this doctrine of 
universal exemption obtains it is rested on the proposition that the 
funds of the corporation are the sU!bject of a trust and that to suffer 
a judgment to be rendered against the corporation and to subject its 
property to the judgment would be an illegal diversion of trust estate. 
The Illinois Court therefore says that an institution "doing chari-
tabl~ work of great benefit to the public without profit, and depend-
ing upon gifts, donations, legacies and bequests made by charitable 
persons for the successful accomplishment of its ·beneficial purposes, 
is not to be hampered in the acquisition of property and funds from 
those wishing to contribute and assist in the charitable work, by any 
doubt that might arise in the minds of such intending donors as to 
whether the funds supplied by them will be applied to the purposes 
for which they illtended to devote them, or diverted to the entirely 
different purpose of satisfying judgments recovered against the 
donee because of the negligent act of those employed to carry the 
beneficient purpose into executio~"!1 In Maine it has been argued 
that unless charitable institutions ·are exempted "private gift and 
public aid would not long be contributed to feed the hungry maw of 
litigation, and charitable institutions of all kinds would ultimately 
cease or become greatly impaired in their usefulness".42 The Penn-
sylvania Court has worked itself into a frenzy, exclaiming: "How 
much ·better than a thief would be the law itself, were it to apply the 
trust's funds contributed for a charitable object, to pay for injuries 
resulting from the torts or negligence of the trustee."43 In South 
Carolina the court has concluded : "The exemption of public chari-
ties from liability in actions for damages for tort rests not upon the 
relation of the injured person to the charity, but upon grounds of 
public policy, which forbid the crippling or destruction of charities 
which are established for the benefit of the whole public to com-
pensate one or more individual members of the public for injuries 
inflicted ·by the negligence of the corporation itself, or of its superior 
41 1905, Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 385, :'5 N. E. 991, 
2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 556 (affirming 121 Ill. App. 512). 
42 1910, Jensen v. Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 4o8, 411, 78 
Atl. 8g8, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 141. 
•• 1888, Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624 649, 15 Atl. 553, I L. 
R. A. 417, 6 Am. St. Rep. 745. 
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officers or agents, or of its servants or employees. The principle is 
that, in organized society, the rights of the individual must, in some 
instances, •be subordinated to the public good. It is better for the 
individual to suffer injury without compensation than for the public 
to be deprived of the benefit of the charity".44 Similar views have 
been e.xpressed in Maryland,4~ Kentucky,46 Arkansas,41 Missouri,48 
and Tennessee.49 The Massachusetts court has said that "if the 
property of the charity was depleted by the payment of damages its 
usefulness might be either impaired or wholly destr~yed, the object 
of the founder or donors defeated and charitable gifts discour-
aged."~Q No lengthy criticism of this rule will be attempted. Those 
who like it are entitled to their preferences. The author prefers to 
agree with the opinion of the New Hampshire court that it is com-
pletely barren of argument in its favor.111 If natural persons must 
be just before they are generous charities certainly should not be 
allowed to perpetrate injustice to some in order to bestow charity 
on others. If public policy demands such a rule the legislature not 
the courts should make the first move. 
Fortunately the great majority of the states do not recognize any 
such absolute exemption, but make a distinction not only between 
•• 1916, Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S. C. 197, 200, 
201, 88 S. E. 649. 
" 1885, Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495; 1917, 
Loeffler v. Sheppard and Enroch Pratt Hospital, 130 Md. 265, 100 Atl. 301, 
L. R. A. 1917 D. 167 • 
.. 1894. Williamson v. Louisville Industrial School, 95 Ky. 251, 24 S. W. 
1o65, 23 L. R. A. 200, 24 Am. St. Rep. 243; 1907, University of Louisville v. 
Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 570, lo6 S. W. 219, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 431. 
41 1905. Woman's Christian National Library Ass'n v. Fordyce, 79 Ark. 
532, 541, 86 S. •W. 417; 19n, Morris v. Nowlin Lumber Co., 100 Ark. 253, 
268, 140 S. W. l. 
•• 1907, Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 679, 99 S. W. 
453; 1909, Whittaker v. St. Luke's Hospital, 137 Mo. App. u6, n7 S. W. n8g. 
•• 1907, Abstein v. Waldon Academy, n8 Tenn. 24, 102 S. W. 351, II L. 
R. A. (N. S.) u79. . 
"" 1go6, Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 149, 78 N. E. 855, 7 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 481, n8 Am. St. Rep. 484- See the discussion of the Massachusetts 
situation in 1910, Horden v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233, 236, 92 N. E. 
6:z6, 139 Am. St. Rep. 889, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 62. 
11 1906, Hewett v. Woman's Hospital Aid Ass'n, 73 N. H. 556, 564 64 
Atl. 190, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 496. 
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beneficiaries and other persons but also between the negligence of 
subsidiary employees of a charity and that of its authorities in em-
ploying or retaining them.52 The feeling which has led to the latter 
distinction has been well expressed in a federal case as follows : "It 
would be intolerable that a good Samaritan, who takes to his home 
a wounded stranger for surgical care, should be held personally liable 
for the negligence of his servant in caring for that stranger."53 The 
situation of course is different where the principal has been negligent 
in the selection of these servants. "The beneficiaries of charitable 
institutions are the poor, who have very little opportunity for selec-
tion, and it is the purpose of the founders to give to them skillful 
and humane treatment. If they are permitted to employ those who 
are incompetent and unskilled, funds bestowed for beneficence are 
diverted from their true purpose, and, under the form of a charity, 
they become a menace to those for whose benefit they are estab-
lished". 5' Though the distinction just pointed out has been branded 
as a "compromise between two irreconcilable principles'',55 it is well 
established.56 It has therefor bee~ held that where a ch;iritable hos-
pital had delegated the duty of placing hot bottles in beds to an in-
competent and wholly inexperienced person employed to wash dishes 
and run errands it is liable for the injury thereby sustained by the 
plaintiff on the ground that it did not exercise ordinary care in its 
selection of servants.57 A complaint by an injured patient alleging 
negligence in the selection of patients on the part of the hospital 
which negligence caused the plaintiff's injury has therefore been held 
not to be demurrable.58 
Negligence on the part of trustees and managers is naturally rare 
and so are the cases which involve such negligence. Negligence, on 
•• 1914, Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 83 S. E. 8o7, Ann. Cas. 1916 E. 250. 
· "'1901, Powers v. Massachusetts Homreopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294, 
.304, 47 C. C. A. 122, 65 L. R. A. 372 . 
.. 1914, Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 597, 83 S. E. 8o7, Ann. Cas. 1916 
E. 250 . 
.. 19o6, Fordyce v. Woman's Christian National Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 
550, 557, g6 S. W. 155, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 485. 
""1917, Goodman v. Brooklyn Hebrew Orphan Asylum, 165 N. Y. Supp. 
949, 178 App. Div. 682. See also 1918, Magnuson v. Swedish Hospital, 99 
Wash. 399, ltig Pac. 828. 
111 1914, St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Williamson, 164 S. W. 36 (Tex. Civ. App.) • 
.. 1914, Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594. 83 S. E. 8o7, Ann. Cas. 1916 E. 250. 
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the other hand, of servants is correspondingly frequent and has 
therefore been quite often investigated by the courts. The conclu-
sion that a charity is not liable for such negligence is almost unani-
mous.59 The drift of all the cases clearly indicates a general con-
viction that an eleemosynary corporation should not be held liable 
for an injury due only to the neglect of a servant and not caused by 
its corporate negligence in the failure to perform a duty imposed on 
it •by law'~.60 "It would ·be a hard rule indeed-a rule calculated to 
repress the charitable instincts of men-that would compel those who 
have freely furnished such accommodations .and services to pay for 
the negligence or mistakes of physicians or attendants that they had 
selected with reasonable care".61 The duty o.f trustees in the exer-
cise of charitable functions does, therefore, not extend beyond the re-
quirement of using reasonable care to select competent servants and 
the demands of substantial justice are met if they are not charged 
with the negligence of those so employed.62 Numerous cases illus-
trating this proposition could well be cited.63 Nor will the mere fact 
that the plaintiff was a pay patient64 and disclaims any right of exe-
.. I9I6, Bishop Randall Hospital v. Hartley, 24 Wyo. 4o8, I6o Pac. 385, 
Ann. Cas. l9I8 E. n72 . 
., 18g5, Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. g8, 123, 33 Atl. 595, 31 
L. R. A. 224 
n I8g4, Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Artist, 6o Fed. 365, 368, 9 C. C. A. 
14, 19 U. S. App. 612, 23 L. R. A. 58I. Followed 1895, Pierce v. Union Pacific 
R. Co., 66 Fed, 44. 13 C. C. A. 323, 32 U. S. App. 48. . 
.. lgOO, Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 151, 78 N. E. 855, 7 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 48I, u8 Am. St. Rep. 44 
.. I905, Parks v. Northwestern University, 2I8 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 L. 
R. A. (N. S.) 556 (affirming 121 Ill. App. 512) ; 1876, McDonald v. Massa-
chusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432. 21 Am. Rep. 529; 1909, Thornton 
v. Franklin Square House, zoo Mass. 465, 467, 86 N. E. 909, 22 L. R. A. (N. 
S.) 486; l8gl, Van Tassel v. Manhattan Eye and Ear Hospital, 6o Hun. 585. 
I5 N. Y. Supp. 620, 39 N. Y. St. Rep. 781; l8g3, Haas v. Missionary Society, 
26 N. Y. Supp. 868, 6 Misc. Rep. 28I; l8g5, Joel v. Woman's Hospital, 35 N. 
Y. Supp. 37, 2 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 264, 6g N. Y. St. Rep. 430; 1907, Bruce v. 
Central Methodist Episcopal Church, 147 Mich. 230, 236, no N. W. 951, IO 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 74; 1909, Cunningham v. Sheltering Arms, n9 N. Y. Supp. 
1033, 135 App. Div. 178 (affirming n5 N. Y. Supp. 576, 6I Misc. Rep. 50I); 
l9I3, Wharton v. Warner, 15 Wash. 470, 135 Pac. 235, 
.. l8g4, Downes v. Harper Hospital, IOI Mich. 555, 6o N. W. 42, 45 Am. 
St. Rep. 427, 25 L. R. A. 6o2; 1904. Wilson v. B~ooklyn Homceopathic Hos-
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cution except against the fund derived from pay patients63 ordinarily 
make any difference. It is not usual or desirable that the ministra-
tions of a charitable hospital should be confined exclusively to the 
poor or indigent. Those of moderate means and not a· few rich 
people resort to such hospitals for treatment especially in surgical 
cases. From patients not indigent a payment is commonly permitted 
or required. ~ut the degree of care in all cases should be the same. 
Certain luxuries may be given to those who pay for them, but no 
greater care should ·be given to the rich person than to the pauper.116 
Nor will it make any difference that the institution is unincorpo-
rated,67 or that the patient is committed to it instead of seeking it,68 
or that the negligence is very gross, such as operating on the right 
side for an inguinal hernia located on the left side.69 
Not all the states however have seen their way clear to exempt a 
charity from li~bility to a pay patient for the negligence of a nurse 
or physician. Such patients have therefore been allowed to recover 
in Rhode Island and Alabama for the negligence of an inteme,70 or 
a nurse71 selected with due care by the hospital. Similarly a chari-
table hospital in Georgia which accepted a patient for compensation 
and without her husband's consent performed an autopsy on her 
body "to gratify professional curiosity" has been held liable in dam-
ages for the mental suffering and injury caused to the patient's sur-
viving spouse.72 It is interesting to note however that the Rhode 
Island case was subsequently overruled by the legislature by pro-
viding that "no hospital incorporated by the General Assembly of 
this state, sustained in whole or in part ·by charitable contributions or 
pital, 89 N. Y. Supp. 619, 97 App. Div. 37; I909, Cunningham v. Sheltering 
Arms, supra; Igoo, Conner v. Sisters of the Poor, IO Ohio S. & C. P. Der. 
86, 7 Ohio N. P. 5I4; I90I, Powers v. Massachusetts Homreopathic Hospital, 
IQ9 Fed. 294. 47 C. C. A. I22, 65 L. R. A. 372 (affirming IOI Fed. 8!)6) • 
.. I9IO, Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. Io87, 136 Am. 
St. Rep. 879. 
68 1901, Powers v. Massachusetts Homceopathic Hospital, s11pra. 
•
1 Igo6, Farrigan v. Pevear, I93 Mass. I47, 78 N. E. 855, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
48I, n8 Am. St. Rep. 484. 
.. 19I5, Smith v. State, 154 N. Y. Supp. Ioo3, 169 App. Div. 438 . 
.. I90I, Collins v. New York Post Graduate Medical School and Hospital, 
6g N. Y. Supp. Io6,.59 App. Div. 63. 
•• I879, Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, I2 R. I. 4n, 34 Am. Rep. 675. 
n l9I5, Tucker v. Mobile. Infirmary Ass'n, I9I Ala. 572, 68 So. 4. L. R. A. 
I9I5 D n67. 
12 1907, Medical College v. Rushing, I Ga. App. 468, 57 S. E. Io83. 
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endowments, shall be liable for the neglect, carelessness, want of skill 
or .for the malicious acts, of any of its officers, agents or employees in 
the management of, or for the care or treatment of, any of the 
patients or inmates of such hospital".73 
It will be next in order to pass in review the various ground~ on 
which charities have been exempted from liability for the torts of 
their carefully chosen employees. The argument already noticed 
that it is a diversion of a trust fund to permit such a liability is 
clearly insufficient to explain the distinction between the negligence 
-of trustees and managers and the negligence of servants and em-
ployees. It must be clear as day that a judgment given on either 
ground will equally divert the trust fund. "Certainly liability for 
negligence in the selection of servants may impair the integrity of 
the trust estate just the same as liability for the negligence of ser-
vants though of course not so frequently".7~ Followed to its logical 
conclusion the trust theory must result in an absolute immunity 
from damages of any character.75 "If the rule exists it must neces-
sarily apply to all torts and in all cases".76 While the theory can 
therefore be used in supporting a total exemption of charities from 
tort liability it will not serve to support the distinction above 
pointed out. 
Some courts have aattempted to justify the rule by arguing that the 
rule of respo11deat superior has no application to the situation. The 
Connecticut court has therefore stated that this rule is one of public 
policy to the effect that an injury done by one who is irresponsible 
must be answered for by his superior, when for his own convenience 
and emolument such superior has given the wrongdoer the oppor-
tunity to commit the injury; that a charity does not come within its 
reason as it derives no benefit from the acts of its servants and that 
therefore the rule has no application to it.77 Similarly, the Massachu-
setts court has said that acting for the benefit of the public solely in 
representing a public interest does not involve such a private pe-
"GENERAL LAWS RHODFl ISLAND, l8g6, page 538. 
t• 1910, Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233, 237. 92 N. E. 626, 139 
Am. St. Rep. 889, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 62. 
n 1915, Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 582, 68 So. 4. 
L. R. A. 191•5 D u67. 
10 l9II, Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, n2 N. Y. Supp. 566, 569, 
128 App. Div. 214. 
11 1895, Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 123-126, 33 Atl. 595, 
31 L. R. A. 224 
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cuniary interest as lies at the foundation of the doctrine of 
respondeat superior."8 And the Wisconsin court has stated that 
"since charitable hospitals perform a quasi-public function in minis-
tering to the poor and sick without any pecuniary profit to themselves, 
the doctrine of respondeat su.perior should not be applied to them in 
favor of those receiving their charitable services".79 
The trouble with this theory is that it proves too much. If a 
charity is not to be responsible on this ground for the negligence of 
its employees it should equally not ·be held liable for the negligence of 
its officers and managers. If it is not to be liable to its patients it 
should equally be exempt from liability as against strangers. There 
would, therefore, seem to be no distinction whether the servant care-
lessly injures one while in the hospital or in the .street.80 The trustees 
"could not in -case of a tort committed by one of their members apply 
the funds in their hands to the payment of a judgment recovered 
therefor''.81 A charity thus freed from legal restraint instead of 
being a blessing might very well become a curse. Instead of doing 
charity it might be doing injustice. 
Some i::ourts have hit upon a waiver theory to explain the situa-
tion. It has been said that any citizen who accepts the service of a 
charitable hospital does so upon the implied assurance that he will 
assert no complaint which has for its object or for its result a total 
or partial destruction of the institution itself.82 From this it is con-
cluded that by accepting the benefit he by implied contract exempts 
his benefactor from liability for the negligence of the carefully 
chosen servants of the charity.83 ';!.'he objection to this theory is that 
'"1906, Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 150, 78 N. E. 855, 7 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 481, u8 Am. St. Rep. 484-
.. 1916, Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 170, 16o N. W. 173. See cases 
cited in lgo8, Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, u2 N. Y. Supp. 566, 
568, 128 App. Div. 214-
.. lgOO, Noble v. Hahnemann Hospital, g8 N. Y. Supp. 6o5, 6o7, 112 App. 
Div. 663, 18 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 365. 
81 1888, Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624 647, 15 At!. 553, I L. 
R. A. 417, 6 Am. St. Rep. 745 . 
.. 1907, Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 679, 680, 99 S. 
W. 453. 
83 1914 Thomas v. German General Benevolent Society, 168 Cal. 183, 188, 
141 Pac. u86; 1906, Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 149, 78 N. E. 855, 7 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 481, n8 Am. St. Rep. 484; 1901, Powers v. Massachusetts 
Homceopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 303, 304 47 C. C. A. 122, 65 L. R. A. 372. 
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it does violence to the facts. "A patient entirely unskilled in legal 
principles, his body racked with pain, his mind distorted with fever, 
is held to know, by intuition, the principle of law that the courts after 
years of travail have at last produced."84 
It will not be necessary to accept any of the above theories. There 
is a logical explanation based on facts which clarifies the situation. 
The doctrine of qualified immunity where no negligence appears in 
the selection or retention of agents or servants can properly and logi-
cally be rested in most cases upon the theory that the physicians and 
surgeons in attendance upon patients in hospitals or the nurses who 
are under their direction are not the servants of the hospital in the 
true sense because as to the nature and manner of their service they 
are not under the direction of the defendant, but that they become 
qnd remain the servants of the patient as long as they are in attend-
ance upon him and that hence the charity has performed its f.ull duty 
when it has exercised due care in the selection of competent persons 
for such service. 85 Hence the New York Court has held that a 
hospital is not responsible for an unauthorized operation performed 
on a patient by the doctors and nurses connected with it. ss A hos-
pital in Maine has been absolved from blame for the death of a 
patient by falling out of a window where the patient occupied a 
private room being placed there by her physician who retained full 
charge of her case and directed the nurses and.house doctors who 
gave her such attention as her case called for.s7 EYen the Rhode 
Island court in holding a hospital liable for the negligence of a nurse 
has expressly recognized that where the hospital does not agree to 
do more than furnish hospital accommodations, leaving the patient 
to find his own physi~ian or surgeon the hospital is plainly not liable 
for their torts on the ground that they are not its servants.s8 
In order to reeover it will therefore be necessary to show that the 
relation of master and servant actually existed at the time of the in-
.. 1914 Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, g8 S. C. 25, 36, 81 S. E. 512. The 
extract is from the dissenting opinion. 
80 1912, Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. I. 22, 28, 29, 85 Atl. 120, 42 L. 
R. A. (N. S.) uog. 
'"1914 Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, 2u N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92, 
52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 505, Ann. Cas. 1915 C. 581. 
11 1910, Jensen v. Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 4o8, 78 Atl. Sg8, 
33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 141 . 
.. 1879, Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 4u, 423, 34 Am. Rep. 675. 
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jury. It follows that a hospital which keeps an ambulance at a livery 
stable the owner of which furnishes the horse and driver, is not re-
sponsible for a collision caused 'by the negligence of such driver. It 
does not employ the driver, ·though it can bring such pressure to bear 
as would force the owner of the stable to discharge him.89 A uni-
versity has been held not to ·be liable for the acts of its agents in set-
ting gopher guns on its campus through which the plaintiff was in-
jured. Though the preservation of its grounds are desirable it is 
not organized to engage in landscape gardening. 90 
It has been seen that the distinction with which we have just been 
dealing is well established. It has also been seen that the mental 
process ·by which it has been reached is far from uniform. In fact 
the cases on this subject present an almost hopelessly tangled mass 
of reason and unreason such as is not often encountered in the law. 
They show a marked difference in the process by which they reach 
resuJts. This appears in the tests adopted to ascertain what is a cor-
porate duty and a corporate neglect, in the confusion of the quasi 
trust imposed on each ·corporation with the relation of a strictly legal 
trustee to his trust fund and especially in the various means by which 
courts have sought to escape from the patent injustice of applying 
the extreme doctrine of respondeat superior to the personal defaults 
of the employees of charitable institutions.91 The question is one on 
which the courts have been fertile in drawing subtle distinctions, 
many of them irrelevant to the point for decision, or, at least, leading 
to no principle by which the conclusions reached can be reconciled.92 
Many of the opinions rest on reasons or grounds which may well be 
challenged as fallacious.93 However, "the identity of conclusion 
reached, though by different roads, is a strong proof of its correct-
ness". 94 
80 l9II, Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, 203 N. Y. 191, g6 N. E. 
4o6, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 481, Ann. Cas. 1913 A. 883 . 
.. 1912, Hill v. Tualatin Academy, 6I Ore, 190, lg8, 121 Pac. 901. 
01 1895, Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 123, 33 Atl. 595, 31 
L. R. A. 224 
.. 1909, Whittaker v. St. Luke's Hospital, 137 Mo. App. II6, n8, n7 S. 
W. II8g. 
"'1908, Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, II2 N. Y. Supp. 566, 567, 
128 API>· Div. 214 . 
"'1901, Powers v. Massachusetts Homreopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294, 
304 47 C. C. A. 122, 65 L. R. A. 372. 
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Hospitals maintained by railroad companies and other corpora-
tions either exclusively out of their own funds or in whole or part 
out of deductions made in the wages of its employees for the purpose 
of providing attendance to sick and injured employees present an 
interesting problem. On the one hand employers of large numbers 
of workmen should certainly be encouraged to establish hospitals for 
their employees by exempting them from damage suits for the negli-
gence of their properly selected employees.95 On the other hand it 
may well be said that it is in the pecuniary interest of such employers 
to maintain a state of health and capability among its employees as 
instrumentalities of its business, which consideration in a real sense 
results in a profit.96 In determining whether such a hospital is a 
charity the question whether. the fund taken from the wages of its 
employees is used to make a profit or is so small as to be insufficient 
for the purpose makes an important difference.97 If the fund is 
raised with a view to financial profit it will not be entitled to any con-
sideration as a charity.98 Where, however, it is maintained solely by 
the company,09 or is not maintained with a view to profit though a 
deduction is made from the wages of its beneficiaries100 it will be 
05 1915, Nicholson v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Hospital Ass'n, 9i 
Kans. 480, 155 Pac. 920 . 
.. 1909, Zumwalt v. Texas Central R. Co., 56 Tex. Civ. App. 567, 571. 
121 S. W. II33 (reversed, 103 Tex. 6o3, 1'32 S. W. u3). 
" 1900, Hanway v. Galveston Ry. Co., 94 Tex. 76, 58 S. W. 724-
.. 1899, Texas & Pacific Co. v. Connaughton, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 642, 50 
S. W. 173; 1902, Sawdey v. Spokane Falls & N. R. Co., 30 Wash. 349, 70 Pac. 
972, 94 Am. St. Rep. 88o; 1go8, Phillips v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 2n Mo. 
419, III S. W. 109, 124 Am. St. Rep. 786. 
00 1895, Eighmy v. Union Pacific R. Co., 93 Iowa 538, 61 N. W. 1056, 27 
L. R. A. 296. . 
1
"" 1916, Arkansas Midland Ry. Co. v. Pearson, g8 Ark. 399, 4n, 135 S. 
W. 917, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 317; 1915, Nicholson v. Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Hospital Ass'n, 97 Kans. 480, 155 Pac. 920; 1903, Haggerty v. St. 
Louis, K. & N. W. R. Co., 100 Mo. App. 424. 74 S. W. 456; 1910, Barden v. 
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 152 N. C. 318, 328, 67 S. E. 971; 1903, Poling v. 
San Antonio & A. P. R. Co., 32 Tex. Civ. App. 487, 75 S. W. 69; 1900, Gal-
veston H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Hanway, 57 S. W. 695 (affirmed 94 Tex. 76, 58 
S. W. 724) ; 1910, Texas Cent. R. Co. v. Zumwaldt, 103 Tex. 6o3, 132 S. W. 
n3 (reversing 56 Tex. Civ. App. 567, 121 S. W. n33); 1910, Wells v. Ferry 
Baker Lumber Co., 57 Wash. 658, 107 Pac. 869, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 426; 
1895, Richardson v. Carbon Hill Coal Co., 10 Wash. 556, 648, 39 Pac. 95; 
1894, Union Pacific Ry. Co. Y. Artist, 6o Fed. 365, 9 C. C. A. 14. 19 U. S. App. 
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treated as a charity and hence will not be held responsible for the 
negligence of its carefully selected surgeons and other employees. 
Where, however, it has failed to exercise ordinary care in the selec-
tion of these servants it will be held to be liable.101 Hence a com-
plaint alleging that the plaintiff became a member of the fund and 
that he was injured through the negligence of its physician is demur-
rable for not stating that the association failed to exercise proper 
care in their selection.102 
It has been seen that some courts hold that a waiver on the part 
of the beneficiary of a charity is the real ground of exemption. This 
certainly does not apply to a person who is not a beneficiary. "The 
law may imply an intention on the part of the donors of the chari-
table funds that such funds shall be used for the charitable purpose 
only, and then imply an acquiescence in this intention by all persons 
who accept the benefit of the charity, and in that way spell out a 
waiver by such persons of any responsibility of the institution for the 
negligence or torts of its servants. If the courts want to exempt 
such institutions, this may be a tenable, though some may think a 
rather ingenious or far fetched ground on- which to do it. But no 
such acquiescence or waiver can be attributed to outsiders".103 There 
are no valid grounds upon which it can be held that the rights of 
those who are not beneficiaries of a trust can be in any way affected 
by the will of its founder. The rights of such persons are created 
by general laws, and the duties of those administering the trust to 
respect those rights are also created by general laws. A person 
should not be allowed to nullify the law of the state, even in creating 
a public charity. If the advantage accruing from such a charity is 
to be the ground for exemption the argument should be addressed to 
the legislative and not to the judicial branch of the government.10' 
712, 23 L. R. A. 581. Followed 1895, Pierce v. Union Pacific R. Co., 66 Fed. 
44, 13 C. C. A. 323, 32 U. S. App. 48. 
101 1907, Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Buchanan, 126 Ky. 288, 103 S. W. 272, 
31 Ky. Law' Rep. 722 (reversing 27 Ky. Law Rep. n93, 88 S. W. 312); 1893, 
Richardson v. Carbon Hill Coal Co., 6 Wash. 52, 32 Pac. io12, 20 L. R. A. 
338. 
102 1903, Plant System Relief and Hospital Department v. Dickerson, 118 
Ga. 647, 650, 45 S. E. 483. 
103 1go8, Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, n2 N. Y. Supp. 566, 570, 
128 App. Div. 214 
10< 1907, Bruce v. Central M. E. Church, 147 Mich. 230, 252, 253, uo N. 
W. 951, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 74, 
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A charity founded to benefit mankind should not be allowed to avoid 
doing justice to its very employees. It, like other persons, must be 
made to ·be just before it is generous. Besides a rule which exempts 
it from liability may actually prevent its growth or even bring about 
its extinction. It might conceivably become impossible for it to pro-
cure employees if these employees are not protected from injustice. 
A young woman employed by a hospital at ten dollars a month who 
as an additional consideration receives instruction and gathers ex-
perience in practical nursing has, therefore, been allowed to recover 
damages from the hospital for contracting diphtheria from a patient 
whom she was ordered to nurse without being told the nature of his 
ailment.105 Other similar cases have been decided by other courts.108 
What is true of an employee certainly holds doubly good in regard 
to a stranger. It would be manifestly unjust and contrary to public 
policy to hold that a person run over and injured on a public high-
way by a horse and wagon belqnging to a charity and driven negli-
gently by its servant would not be entitled to recover against the 
charity while a person similarly injured by the negligence of the 
employee of an express company would be allowed to recover against 
it. A hospital therefore is liable for such an injury though it has not 
been negligent in selecting its servant.107 Persons negligently run 
over by the ambulance of a hospital,1°& or by the automobile of a 
library109 have, therefore, recovered damages for their injuries. 
Midway between servants and strangers there are invitees who 
have certain rights the breach of which is attended with legal con-
105 Igo6, Hewett v. ·woman's Hospital Aid Ass'n, i3 N. H. 556, 64 Atl." 
I9o, i L. R. A. (N. S.) 496. 
1
"' I907, Bruce v. Central M. E. Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N. W. 95I, 
IO L. R A. (N. S.) 74; 1913, Mc!nemy v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 122 
Minn. IO, I5, I4I N. W. 837; I9I2, Armendarez v. Hotel Dieu, I45 S. W. 
I030, 1031 (Tex. Civ. App.) ; 1914 Hotel Dieu v. Armendarez, I67 S. W. 18I 
(Tex. Civ. App.). 
101 I9I2, Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. I. 22, 43, 44, 85 Atl. I2o, 42 L. 
R. A. (N. S.) 1109. 
- Igo8, Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, 112 N. Y. Supp. 566, I28 
App. Div. 2I4; I9I7, Van Ingen v. Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn, 164 N. Y. 
Supp. 832, 99 Misc. 655 (affirmed, I6g N. Y. Supp. 412, 182 App. Div: 10). 
109 I9I3, Johnson v. Chicago, 258 Ill. 494, IOI N. E. g6o (affirming 174 Ill. 
App. 414). But see 1go6, Fordyce "· \Voman's Christian Library Ass'n, i9 
Ark. 550, g6 S. W. I55, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 485. 
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sequences.110 Hence a physician injured in a hospital while accom-
panying a patient has been allowed recovery. Similarly mechanics 
injµred while making repairs on the premises of a charitable institu-
tion have recovered the same as if the damage had occurred on the 
property of any other owner.111 · 
To sum up: A number of states have, following English dicta, 
exempted charities from all tort liability against beneficiaries as well 
as others on the ground that public policy demands that the trust 
fund •be not diverted to paying damages. The great majority of the 
<:=ourts, however, do justice to employees, strangers and invitees •by 
holding the charity to the same degree of care exacted from other 
entities. In regard to beneficiaries they hold the charity liable for 
injuries resulting from the negligence of the trustees or managers in 
selecting incompetent servants, but not for the negligence of senants 
carefully selected. This rule applies also to the various relief funds 
created by corporations, provided that these funds are not used for 
the purpose of making a financial profit. It does not apply of course, 
to non-charitable ventures or to charities which are conducted by the 
public a~thorities. While the rule is well established the reason 
given by the courts to support it are very various indeed. The most 
satisfactory reason advanced is that a charity has performed its 
whole duty when it tenders to a beneficiary a competent servant and 
that thereafter such servant becomes the servant of the patient rather 
than the servant of the charity.112 
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13, I N. E. 836, 54 Am. Rep. 436. 
= 1918, Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hospital Ass'n, 123 Neb. 343, 167 N. 
w. 2o8. 
112 1909, Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233, 92 N. E. 626, 139 Am. 
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